

DAUBERT AND MEINONG

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1. Introduction

During the last twenty years various pieces from the philosophy of Johannes Daubert (1877-1947), the only contemporary thinker whom Husserl explicitly valued as congenial to him,¹ have been brought to the attention of the philosophical public.² There is therefore no point in trying to introduce Daubert here again. Suffice it to recall that he was the architect of the Phenomenological Movement, on the earliest (the Munich-Göttingen) branch of which he imprinted his own realist version of phenomenology. This he did mainly by lectures and oral discussions; in fact, Daubert did not publish anything during his life-time. Also the present exposition draws upon his unpublished shorthand manuscripts deposited since 1967 at the Bavarian State Library in Munich,³ the transcription of which by Elisabeth Schuhmann is nearing completion.

Daubert's early sympathy for Husserl's *Logical Investigations* derives from the fact that quite in general he felt particularly close to the school of Franz Brentano.⁴ He was well at home in Brentano's *Psychologie* and still more so in the early work of Marty.⁵ Also Meinong figured highly on his agenda. Mainly in 1906 and 1912 he studied his works intensively. We know that he was especially well acquainted with *Über Annahmen* of 1902 (A I 5/128-135; A I 20/120f.),⁶ with "Über Gegenstandstheorie" of 1904 (A I 10/55) and with Rudolf Ameseder's closely related article "Beiträge zur Grundlegung der Gegenstandstheorie" (A I 10/57-59) which had appeared in the same volume, as

¹ [Husserl 1994], vol. II, 79.

² For a summary see [Schuhmann 1991], vol. 1: A-K, 195f.

³ Cf. [Avé-Lallemant 1975], 125-138 (including the archival signatures of Daubert's MSS).

⁴ Daubert's realism is clearly connected with his plan, pursued between 1899 and ca. 1906, to write a PhD dissertation on the consciousness of reality. It is characteristic that he by preference moulded this project in terms of the Brentanist theory of existential judgments.

⁵ Cf. [Schuhmann 1990].

⁶ In what follows Daubert's MSS will be cited according to the official page numbers of the Bavarian State Library, wherever extant (MSS A I 2, A I 5, A I 6), and in all other cases according to the numberings contained in the transcriptions of Elisabeth Schuhmann. References are given in the text.

well as with the second edition of *Über Annahmen* from 1910 (A I 16/53-55). In what follows, I shall however not expound Daubert's reactions to these works separately, but rather study the way in which he integrated, refined and criticized Meinong's theories while developing his own philosophy. Thus I will concentrate on three major topics worked out by Daubert with regard to Meinong: judgment, negation and the Meinongian objective in its relation to the Husserlian *Sachverhalt* or state of affairs.

2. The Judgment

According to Daubert, judgments, with their peculiar type of reference, are brought about by acts of judging. A judgment thus depends on certain acts and at the same time points beyond itself to objects. These two features are for him however not independent of each other. True, Meinong adhered, too, to the Brentanian principle of the necessary foundation of all judgments in presentations, according to which judgments always include presentations and therefore are based on presentational acts. But he also maintained that at the most basic level presentations have only a potential relatedness to objects. One can undergo a presentation just as one undergoes a feeling. In such cases any explicit reference to an object is lacking. This reference comes to the fore only when the presentation in question becomes the psychological basis of a corresponding judgment or assumption.⁷ Daubert, by contrast, insists that such an explicit directedness towards an object should not without further ado be equated with the presentation's intention to refer to the object. The latter may indeed occur without the former, but this does not mean that one had to ban the intentional element from the presenting act altogether in order to preserve it for the act of judging. For every presentation in fact means, i.e. intends something, and this something must be a certain objectuality. In this respect the presentation does not differ from the judgment which in its turn intends something, even though it is far from being sure that it indeed grasps its object in all cases, let alone that it would always grasp it adequately. The question whether or not my intention to hit something that transcends the act, is well-founded and correct, is an issue possibly to be dealt with in a theory of cognition, but is irrelevant within the framework of a phenomenological description of the act of judging (A I 5/130v). Phenomenology rather confines itself to the question of the act's internal reference to the object. Meinong thus is no doubt right in distinguishing between the warranted and the unwarranted affirmative judgment, and again between these and the negative judgment,⁸ since these types of judgment all relate in quite different ways to the reality they are supposed to be about. But Daubert maintains that such variations

⁷ [Meinong 1902], 102.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 95f.

“make no difference for the phenomenological investigation” (A I 6/2r). Where Meinong had allowed for only two ways of considering things – either one must set out from our intellectual functions in order to study their relation to reality, or one starts with reality and shows how it relates to our intellectual functions,⁹ Daubert therefore opts for a third, the phenomenological way: one has to begin with a description of our intentional functions and only then should go on “to consider what is conceived and meant in them, without already opposing, after the manner of some epistemology, that which is intended, as ‘that which is real’, to our cognition of it” (A I 6/2r; A I 5/130v).

It is for this reason that concerning phenomenological method Daubert agrees with Meinong in rejecting Brentano’s well-known attempt to reduce all judgments to existential judgments of the type “A exists” (this is what Meinong calls the thetic function of judgment). But for the same reason he also rejects Meinong’s own first attempt to broaden this reduction by adding to it a second, the synthetic type of judgment which has the form “a relation between a subject A and a predicate B exists”.¹⁰ Now Meinong reports that he gave up this theory for the reason that in most cases we lack a distinct awareness of such a relation between the subject and the predicate (generally we are aware only of the A and the B), so that we cannot affirm the existence of this relation. Daubert on the contrary rejects this type of reduction, because he still sees at work in it the notion of existence as something central to judgments. The clear-cut Brentanist distinction between presentation and judgment which he endorses, too, does not imply that existential judgments should be allowed to play a privileged role in our mental life (A I 9/15). No matter how broadly existence may be conceived,¹¹ it is certainly not a judgment’s exclusive or even primary task to affirm it. For in that case existence should be the primary target of our judgments, where in most cases we rather want to affirm something about certain occurrences, events or other facts. We generally do not judge about a thing’s existence, but rather state or report what happens to be the case. An illuminating case in question seems to be any judgment concerning our own judgments, such as “I am convinced that S is P” (A I 9/20). This example, which Daubert in fact takes over from Meinong¹² in order to turn it against him, neither affirms the existence of SP, nor does it state the existence of a conviction I would otherwise be unaware of. It rather articulates a fact I know

⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 143f.

¹¹ Daubert is of course well aware of the fact that existence (in the sense of being) in Meinong spans far beyond reality, and explicitly sympathizes with this view: “Meinong is quite right to say that everybody who thinks that all being is real, must needs lapse into psychologism” (A I 2/48v; the reference is to [Meinong 1904], 24f.).

¹² [Meinong 1902], 28.

pretty well even when I do not judge it at all.¹³ Unfortunately Daubert is not more detailed about this example. But in view of his broader philosophical outlook one may presume that to him the judgment in question might in some cases *disclose* the existence of my conviction to another person, but certainly will not first and foremost *affirm* this existence. It will not even disclose this existence *by* affirming it. For such an affirmation stating that I am convinced concerning my being-convinced would in fact display only the existence in me of a second conviction regarding the existence of the first one, instead of simply expressing my very first conviction regarding SP. In other words, the judgments “I am convinced that S is P” and “I affirm the existence in me of a conviction that S is P” do differ. The first one normally centers around S and P, the second one around some conviction of mine.

In a comparable way Daubert also reacts to an attempt by Meinong to save the special position of existential judgments by distinguishing between objects of presentation, i.e. between objects in the common sense of the term, and special objects of thought which Meinong calls objectives. The latter he moreover distinguishes intothetic and synthetic ones. Thus the relation between S and P affirmed in the synthetic judgment, of which he had said earlier that it generally is not presented, can be judged, he now affirms, because it occurs in the object of thought, i.e. in the objective, even without having been presented before.¹⁴ But this distinction, Daubert is convinced, is not a good way out and certainly does not plead in favor of existential judgments. For in all our judgments it is not presentation that counts, but thought. A judgment is never and in none of its aspects a way of presenting, but rather a way of thinking things (A I 6/2v). It is therefore of little help to assign S and P to the realm of presentation, and the “is” to the sphere of thought. Rather all judgments are made up of a matter of the same kind. In this sense one can even raise the question whether the objects of judging do really that much differ from the objects of other types of thinking (such as assuming or questioning), or whether they are not all of the same kind, insofar as they pertain to one and

¹³ Meinong would certainly remain unconvinced by this effort to unhinge his theory of judgment. For he follows Brentano in calling perception, which is an act assuring us of the existence of certain objects, a kind of judging. More specifically internal perception which is at issue here, is according to him a type of judgment, too ([Meinong 1904], 25f.). But on the other hand it is uncertain to which degree this answer would indeed solve the problem. For even though one might ascribe to perception conviction, it will probably be difficult to find in it Meinong’s second characteristic of judgment, the yes-no-alternative. True, one could avoid this problem by affirming that in fact perception is always an affirmative judgment. But the idea of at least a possibility of negative perception looks distinctly odd.

¹⁴ [Meinong 1902], 163.

the same sphere of thought (A I 6/3v).¹⁵ It goes without saying that with such considerations Daubert moves away not only from the single Brentanian characteristic of judgment which is conviction, but also from Meinong's additional feature of the judgment's yes-or-no-decidability, reaffirming a more traditional view that links judging to intellectual and more specifically to conceptual activity. Correspondingly he also does not relate Meinong's talk of variable degrees of intensity of judgment¹⁶ to the judging act itself, but rather to the certainty of the conviction with which we judge.¹⁷ For there are no intensities of thought, but only of our certainty with regard to what we think.

Meinong himself seeks to account for the conceptual nature of (most) judgments by distinguishing between affirmations of existence on the one hand which might be *thetic* judgments involving concepts, but also perceptions, and affirmations of what obtains on the other.¹⁸ The latter, according to him, always involve abstract concepts. To this Daubert objects that "the phenomenological essence of the consciousness of objects" is in all affirmations of one and the same nature (A I 7/72). Elaborating on this, one could say that the distinction between what exists and what obtains remains intrinsic to judgments as such and depends on the nature of what in each case we happen to affirm. But perception is certainly not at issue in this context, as it neither affirms nor denies anything whatsoever: it may disclose existence, but does not affirm it. This is not to say that there are no links between what is perceived and what is judged. Quite to the contrary, in one respect Daubert brings them together much more closely than Meinong had done. Meinong had divided up objectuality into either objects or objectives, and stipulated that the latter take in the former ones in the same way judgments or assumptions include presentations. Now if perception is to be reckoned among judgments, one may wonder whether we ever encounter anything but objectives, i.e. whether objects are only (more or less abstract) elements occurring *in* objectives, just as presentations seem to be nothing but abstract parts of judgments. Thus Meinong's original bipartition of objectuality threatens to absorb objects into objectives somewhat after the fashion of early Wittgenstein.

Daubert will to a degree certainly follow this move. But he does not split up the notion of objectuality in general into two halves that are, primarily at least, of equal dignity. And he moreover sticks to the founding character of objects

¹⁵ The exact wording of this text is: "Or is there rather only one object both for judging and for other kinds of thinking?"

¹⁶ [Meinong 1902], 192 and 260.

¹⁷ Cf. A I 7/49: "Affirmation and negation are alternatives, in the way in which pleasure and displeasure are alternatives. The feeling of conviction or the certainty is, like all feelings, gradually variable ... The intensity of the certainty concerns both the negative and the affirmative judgment."

¹⁸ [Meinong 1902], 95.

vis-à-vis objectives. As to the first point, he is no doubt ready to concede that, e.g., both presenting and judging are to be subsumed under the general notion of “consciousness of objects”, and that this consciousness in both cases is modified in different ways. But in different acts we are not of necessity faced with different types of objects, but quite often with the same object approached in different ways. In judging we aim more specifically at securing a certain factualness regarding the object. At any rate we intend to make contact with it. This is why Daubert states that “it would make no sense to speak of judgment, if there were not also imagination and error”, i.e. if there were not different ways of relating to objects which do not, and even do not intend to, make contact with them (A I 8/145). It is in opposition to these types of act that the peculiar nature of judgment becomes clear. And it is part of its nature that it approaches objects in a specific way, just as other acts do in their peculiar way. What distinguishes presentation and judgment, or perception and judgment, is this mode in which the object is brought to consciousness, but not of necessity the object itself. Thus the objective is not an entity to be distinguished from the object, but the object itself approached or unfolded in a certain way by means of our intellectual functions, so that we may assume, judge etc. something with regard to this object.

This leads us to the second point. The implicit Meinongian dilemma of objects that differ from, and therefore do not pertain to the sphere of objectives on the one hand, and of objects that seem to occur only as dependent parts of the objectives themselves on the other, is solved by Daubert by founding objectives *on* objects. One is entitled to do so because objects and objectives have a decisive feature in common: they both are wholes or complexes. Indeed, the objectual correlate of a judgment, Daubert says, is “the whole made up of S and P including the copula, in the sense of Meinong’s objective” (A I 8/91). The different parts of this whole may be independent in relation to each other, but they certainly are not so with regard to the whole.

Now Daubert also subscribes to another Meinongian thesis: in a narrower sense, the judgment’s object does not contain more than is already present in the object of the corresponding presentation itself. As to their content, the presentation “a sick man” does not differ from the judgment “a man is sick”.¹⁹ Yet Daubert insists that already the object “a sick man” is a whole, just as is the objective “a man who is sick”, so that we are not confronted here with an objective vs. an object, but rather with two different types of wholes. The same members “sick” and “man” are in both cases united, albeit in different ways, and it is this different modality, but not some ontological difference that sets the object apart from the objective as something of a special dignity.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 245; cf. A I 6/2r.

3. Negation

This view allows also for a more refined treatment of negative judgments. Daubert is no doubt right when he discerns a pinch of naive realism in Meinong's treatment of objectives as special entities alongside common-sense objects and of judgments as grasping these objectives.²⁰ For this grasp has clearly been styled after the model of perception. Now while there is no negative perception, there are by contrast negative judgments. These Meinong tries to account for by linking them, to be sure, not to positive judgments, but at least to positive assumptions which of necessity would precede them.²¹ Their objectives, he says, are the very ones afterwards denied by the corresponding negative judgment. This solution of the problem how negative judgments are brought about is meant to reconcile the fact that the object of such judgments does not exist, with the other one that they clearly are about something, i.e. that they in one way or other refer to some objectuality.²² The objective is said to be this objectuality which, even though it does not exist, nevertheless obtains, and it obtains even if the objects it involves do not exist. Thus if it is true that during an election period no breach of peace has taken place, it is correct to say so, and this judgment's objective therefore obtains, even though the judgment affirms precisely that there had been no such thing as a breach of peace.²³

Daubert agrees with Meinong in that there is no negation without something preceding it. A negative judgment, he likes to repeat Meinong's striking expression (taken from the theory of music), does not "come in freely" (*setzt nicht frei ein*).²⁴ But he adds at once that one must distinguish between what pertains to the negative judgment itself, insofar as it is judged, and what is just part of "all the other psychological odds and ends involved" (*das sonstige psychologische Drum und Dran*: A I 6/2r).²⁵ Consider again Meinong's

²⁰ A I 5/130v: Meinong "nimmt die Rede vom Erfassen eines Gegenstandes durch das Urteil ernst im naiv realistischen Sinne".

²¹ [Meinong 1902], 106f.

²² This problem is in fact only a special version of the more general one encountered by Brentano's pupils regarding the object of presentation. Where Bolzano had taught that there were objectless presentations, i.e. presentations to which no object corresponds, Brentano had defined psychic acts, and first and foremost presentations, as of necessity referring to a content or object. Husserl had solved this problem in a sense close to Bolzano, and Daubert now does a comparable job with regard to negative "objectives" (in the sense of states of affairs).

²³ [Meinong 1902], 151f.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 105. Cf. A I 8/103; A I 18/59.

²⁵ In a comparable way Daubert also reacts to Meinong's determination of questions as expressing a wish or desire to know ([Meinong 1902], 26, 51ff.): "Such a wish or desire for knowledge no doubt exists, and is no doubt present in most questions actually raised. But here we are to consider whether it makes up the genuine act of questioning.

example: “A breach of peace did not take place”. Here the occurrence of a breach of peace is denied. One may rephrase this in a perfectly equivalent statement: “It is a fact that there was no breach of peace”. Here something positive is affirmed, albeit not about the object “breach of peace” but rather about the objective “non-existence of a breach of peace”. What does the equivalence of these statements imply? First of all it is clear that the negation contained in the first judgment does not deny what is affirmed in the second one, which is to say that negation and affirmation here refer to different subject-matters. Moreover the predicate “(It) is a fact” does not add any new material to the subject it is about, but only confirms that – to use Daubert’s words – my thought of a non-occurrence of a breach of peace “is not arbitrary, but makes contact with reality” (A I 6/3r). The first judgment therefore states that there was no such thing as a breach of peace, the second one says that I am right when I think of such a non-occurrence. In this sense the second judgment does not affirm that there obtains a relation of adequacy between my thought and reality,²⁶ but rather confirms the correctness of my original thought about the reality in question. But this thought and the negation occurring in it had been brought about already by the very first judgment: “A breach of peace did not occur”. So we may conclude that on the one hand both judgments possess the same meaning-content and stand under the same truth conditions (A I 6/3v), where on the other it is exclusively the first one that constitutes the meaning-content in question – a meaning-content that already contains the negation.

So if we are to understand negation, we are to stick to our first judgment. And here a judgment of the type “S is not P” according to Daubert expresses first of all my awareness of an antagonism between S and P (A I 6/3r). Yet such an awareness may of course be stated correctly in a positive judgment as well: “There occurs a conflict between S and P”. In order to reach negation, something more is needed. Up to here Meinong is certainly right in assigning to negative judgments a necessary antecedent in our thought. Yet, Daubert says, although negation cannot “come in freely” but always “makes a presupposition”, this presupposition is “neither a judgment nor an assumption” (A I 8/103). For otherwise, i.e. even in the case of a presupposed assumption, we would not get beyond the statement of a conflict between such a positive assumption and some other positively given matter of fact. Among the necessary presuppositions (the “odds and ends” mentioned above) of negative judgment Daubert therefore lists, first, a certain interest of ours: “There must obtain a certain interest in the being or non-being of P, otherwise one cannot

At any rate this does not go without saying, as Meinong thinks.” (A I 2/30v; cf. A I 2/39v, A I 2/75r, and A I 18/117). Cf. [Schuhmann and Smith 1987], 360f.

²⁶ This is why Daubert doubts Meinong’s affirmation that in the statement: “It is a fact that a breach of peace did not occur” we indeed perform an affirmative judgment of the usual type (A I 6/3v).

deny" (A I 8/104). Moreover this interest must motivate us to look "whether P is appropriate or not, whether it fits or whether an incompatibility shows up". And finally we must demand of the object that it accepts a certain P as belonging to it, a demand the object then is to reject (A I 8/104). It is only in this threefold process that negation is brought about.

A negation therefore originates only where there is an alternative at hand. Now things usually display their attributes in a well-determined and so to speak one-sided way. They are A or B, but not "either A or B". Therefore the alternative presupposed in the negative judgment cannot derive from things as they stand. It is indeed us who approach them with this alternative in mind. But on the other hand this alternative is also nothing psychic, for the P and not-P both refer to the objects we address (A I 18/91). Daubert therefore concludes that the alternative involved is an element of thought, i.e. a "disjunctive intention", and more specifically of thought that is interested in objects. This interest means that I am ready to let the thing decide whether it accepts or rejects one of the determinations I propose to it, and that by consequence I am ready to accept the verdict of the things regarding my thought about them.²⁷ "The reason why there occurs a contradiction [between my thought and things] must also be authoritative for me" (A I 8/104). The essence of negation proper lies precisely in this demand that the thing be offered a certain determination which then it rejects.

In this sense one may conclude that negation for Daubert is an affair that is initiated by thought activity. Out there in the world there are negative objects as little as there are negative facts or states of affairs. In things there may occur relations of antagonism or incompatibility, but not negations. "All negation and position is a peculiarity of thought", Daubert states (A I 10/54). And in another context he adds: "The fact that a not-being-thus can be meant and therefore seems to lie in the objective sphere, is no reason for saying that it belongs as to its nature to the world of objects or of states of affairs". In this context he explicitly criticizes "the unclear position of Meinong's objectives" which on the one hand are said to be the bearers of negation, but on the other are supposed to lie outside the realm of our thought formations (A I 9/180).

4. *The Objective*

In Husserl, one knows, the two functions of the Meinongian objective are assigned to different entities: position and negation, just as truth and falsity, belong to propositions (*Sätze*), where the task to make them true, i.e. to show their adequacy to facts, belongs to states of affairs. One also knows that

²⁷ For a more detailed discussion of Daubert's theory of negation, see [Schuhmann 1987].

Meinong deliberately rejects this division of labor²⁸ and in most cases equates his objective with Husserl's proposition.²⁹ Daubert here sides with Husserl, and he does so mainly for two reasons already hinted at. First of all, he bases the objective on the object, thereby excluding negation from the realm of an objective conceived in the Meinongian way as an entity independent of thought. And secondly, he ascribes to it the authority of normatively deciding about the correctness of our judgments, thereby excluding Meinong's conception of the objective as a mind-dependent entity. Let us discuss both aspects in detail.

As to the first point, Daubert criticizes Meinong's attempt to describe correct judgments as judgements that get at their objective, where incorrect ones would fail to do so.³⁰ This authoritative character of the objective rather pertains to the states of affairs aimed at in our judgments. Thus Daubert concludes that judgments always "have their objectives, no matter whether they are right or wrong, even though this objective is not always adequate to facts ... The objective is not itself the fact, but in the objective facts are meant." (A I 5/133r).³¹ Objectives in this sense therefore are not the states of affairs themselves, but rather that which is about them: they are Husserlian propositions. To this degree Daubert sees the objective as something analogous to concepts. Objectives relate to states of affairs in a way comparable to the one in which concepts relate to general objects denoted by them (A I 9/198). They are about them, this is to say, without thereby prejudicing anything whatsoever with regard to their existence or non-existence as separate entities. As to the difference between the realms of proposition and of state of affairs, Daubert notes that "compatibility and a belonging together [of S and P] occur in the state of affairs, position and negation in the objective" (A I 10/64). Still more explicitly "one is to attribute the relation of harmony and conflict to the state of affairs, but negation and position, in analogy to modality, to the judgment, or better to its objective" (A I 10/52). Daubert indeed wants to "take up the old idea that both quality [i.e. the affirmative or denying character of judgment] and modality do not concern being as such, but rather get constituted in the relation of our presentations to what is" (A I 10/53). Modalities, this is to say, modify strictly speaking only our thoughts. But this modification is not something to be done arbitrarily. Rather it is dictated by that which they are directed at, i.e. by whatever is the case. Without entering into the details of this doctrine of qualification and modalization, let us note here only that it does not

²⁸ Cf. [Meinong 1910], 98ff.

²⁹ [Meinong 1902], 197 n.; [Meinong 1904], 22.

³⁰ [Meinong 1902], 168.

³¹ Referring to [Meinong 1910], Daubert rephrases this criticism in 1912 as follows: "Meinong's main difficulty probably lies in the relation of the pseudo-existing, pregiven objectives to the factual ones. Truth to him is the harmony between them. But in fact we do not have two objectives, but only one." (A I 16/54).

diverge too far from Meinong's own views on the necessity and impossibility of objectives as determined by a judgment's relation to them.³²

It should however be clear that with these considerations we come to the second part of Daubert's view on the objective, according to which it must be a mind-independent, be it mind-related state of affairs. In reaction to Ameseder he states that objectives in this sense are not simply "the ways in which objects are shaped, but include the grasp, by way of thinking, of a certain belonging together" of S and P, i.e. of that which is determined and of its determination (A I 8/159). In fact we usually are directed at objectual unities containing certain determinations. In most cases the things in question therefore are not given to us as simple entities, but rather as complexes or wholes (A I 10/54). We have insisted already earlier on this feature which links objects to objectives (in the sense of states of affairs). Here we have to add that, according to Daubert, to the state of affairs there belong all the material elements and relations between elements that characterize the objects in question. For a state of affairs intends to refer to its objects, albeit not by simply picturing, mirroring or doubling them, but by unfolding them discursively. "It is in this discursive and relating analysis and synthesis of the function of cognizing that new objectivities of a non-real kind become intentionally constituted: the states of affairs and objectives" (A I 10/53). Although the content of the objective thus derives from the object, it receives its specific form only through processes of thought. This is intimated already by the fact that "to one single object two opposite objectives can be opposed positively and negatively" (A I 5/132v). Indeed, for an S that is P it is correct to state both that it is P and that it is not Q. As the equivalence of this negation with that position already indicates, the objective in this sense has a twofold basis: it is founded on, and depends upon, both the object it refers to and the thought that is about this object. Because of this second aspect, the objective is not something real after the manner of the object itself; because of the first one, it functions as that "towards which I finally turn and which offers me fulfilment" (A I 10/56).

This statement seems to be in overt conflict with another one, according to which "that which fulfills and makes true, insofar as it is founded by something real", is the state of affairs, which as such and in this function is however precisely to be *distinguished* from the objective (A I 10/64). A state of affairs, Daubert says, gives to judgment the decision about its truth or falsehood, but "is not itself true or false and insofar differs from the objective" (A I 18/82). Yet there is no reason to worry about this variety of terminology. For Daubert applies the notion of objective not only to the proposition and the state of affairs, but also to a third element in between, an element the remarks just quoted are in fact about. Where in Meinong we had only the objective and in Husserl both the proposition and the state of affairs to mediate between the

³² [Meinong 1902], 193f.

judgment and its object, Daubert in fact adds a third notion which, though not developed out of Meinong's objective, can in a sense be related to it quite closely and therefore deserves to go under this name: the state of affairs *as* grasped or given in a certain way. "State of affairs and objective", Daubert notes, "do not coincide, if by objective we understand the peculiar correlate of a judgment, and on the other hand determine the state of affairs with regard to the way objects behave in relation to each other" (A I 10/69). In other words: "It always seems as if one were to distinguish between the objective state of affairs (the way things behave properly speaking) ... and the corresponding subjective state of affairs ... which still is to be distinguished from the proposition ... [Its] proper intentional correlate is the objective" (A I 10/78). What Daubert here tries to point out by means of the terms "objective"³³ and the other one (which he quickly abandoned) "subjective state of affairs", can be exemplified most readily by judgments such as "A lies to the left of B" and "B is to the right of A". These judgments have different "objectives", but refer to one and the same state of affairs. But the phenomenon under discussion is not restricted to judgments about relations. One must rather concede that all judgments and even more broadly all thought formations in general, be they assumptions, questions, wishes, commands or whatsoever, refer to states of affairs only by approaching or grasping them *in a certain way*.³⁴ "It is one and the same state of affairs", Daubert says, "that corresponds to the thoughts: 'redness of the rose', 'the rose's being red', 'the rose is red', but also to 'is the rose red?', 'if it were red', 'it is not white'" (A I 18/145). And we may go even farther by stating that when a state of affairs is grasped *as such*, this is only a limit case, albeit a privileged one, of grasping it under some well-determined aspect. This is why Daubert once said, though probably not in all seriousness: "Properly speaking each given fact should bear a proper name. When I grasp it conceptually, we are already faced with a manner of apprehension" (A I 10/70). For in all cases the state of affairs is grasped "qua" this or that (A I 18/154).

To summarize this, one may say that I refer to "existing things that make [my thoughts] true", and that I do so only "under the aspect of my judgments, thoughts, assumptions" (A I 18/81). This notion of the objective as a

³³ Daubert explicitly underlines that already in Meinong himself the objective is not only the correlate of judgment and cognition, but "may be given also in assumptions" (A I 1/26v), so that he feels free to broaden its meaning to refer to the correlates of thought in general.

³⁴ This doctrine was worked out especially by later Husserl who affirms that the object of phenomenology is not the object pure and simple, but "the object in the How of its modes of givenness" (*Ideas I*, trl. by F. Kersten, The Hague / Boston / London 1982, 316).

perspective on an identical state of affairs³⁵ also allows to integrate into a more coherent picture what was said above about modality. We had stated that modality occurs only in thought, and more precisely in thought compelled to think certain modalities in view of the facts it is about. Modalization, we now may conclude, most properly belongs to the sphere of what Daubert once calls the “middle predicates” (A I 9/198), i.e. the realm of the state of affairs as grasped in a certain way. The “is necessarily” or “is possibly” do not pertain to the states of affairs themselves (“two plus two makes four” expresses the same state of affairs as does “two plus two of necessity makes four”). But it also does not pertain to mere thought (“it is necessarily so” does not mean “I cannot but think it to be so”). Modalities rather belong, Daubert says, “to an intentional moment in our thought, to the objective”. For they express the type of certainty we arrive at on the basis of how things in fact stand, i.e. on the basis of a given state of affairs. “A determination’s relation”, Daubert says, “to that which has it, is simply what it is, no matter whether this determination grounds in a thing’s essence or is a matter of fact. An ‘is necessarily’ appears always only when thought toys with the possibility of its being otherwise.” (A I 10/52). The way the facts respond to our thoughts and thereby make us sure about themselves, are expressed by the modalizations our judgments are subject to.

In view of the potentialities inherent in Meinong’s notion of the objective as a powerful means to explain the relation between the various types of being and the different modalities of our thought, one can understand the high praise Daubert gives to Meinong, when he compares his work with both Greek and the Kantian theories of cognition: “What makes objects become what they are? ... This is Plato’s and Aristotle’s old question about the logos ... The main problems of the logic of old, i.e. the problems of the logos and the apriori, are nowadays contained under the heading ‘theory of objects’” (A I 9/199).

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³⁵ It may be worth while to mention here a seeming further complication, according to which Daubert sometimes maintains that the objective is not the variable perspective on a state of affairs, but rather what is identical in certain states of affairs as grasped. But what is at issue here, is once again not a difference in doctrine, but rather in terminology. Thus Daubert says: “The objective is that which is identical in ‘A may be B’, ‘A is possibly B’, ‘that A may be B’ etc. That which in these cases is different, is always the thought” (A I 10/52). Or: “In ‘S is P’, ‘If S were P’, ‘S is to be P’ we have the same being-P (that which Meinong calls the objective)” (A I 2/17v). What is called “objective” here, is that which we have called above the second meaning of this term in Daubert, i.e. the Husserlian state of affairs.

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